How is a categorical imperative possible? : Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative (GMS, III,4) by Schönecker, Dieter
Dieter Schönecker
How is a categorical imperative possible?
Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative (GMS, III,4)
Kant’s deduction of the categorical imperative is the answer to the fol-
lowing question: “How is a categorical imperative possible?” The an-
swer is given in subsection 4 (Sec. 4) of chapter three of the Ground-
work. It is impossible to understand this answer, and hence impossible
to understand Kant’s deduction of the moral law, without taking into
account the overall context of Groundwork III (GMS III). However,
here I can only sketch the overall structure ofGMS III, and therefore
only present a sketch of what I call Kant’s thesis of analyticity.1 This
thesis is developed in Sec. 1 ofGMS III; however, it appears time and
again in GMS III, and it deserves special attention (part 1). Part 2,
then, offers a close reading and analysis of Kant’s deduction.
The purpose of this paper is not to criticize or make philosophical
use of Kant’s deduction. As I have argued elsewhere, one of the ma-
jor obstacles of serious (i. e. historical) Kant-research is the inability
(and unwillingness) to distinguish between the question of what a text
means and and the question of whether what it manifests is true.2
1. Structure and task of GMS III:What does Kant want to achieve?
In the preface of theGMS,Kant claims that his Groundwork is “noth-
ing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme princi-
1 For a detailed analysis of Groundwork III, cf. Schönecker (1999); this article is
based upon that book. Here I will not address the secondary literature (I did so
extensively in Schönecker, 1999); as far as I can tell, little has been published since
that pays close attention to the text. However, I will make some brief comments on 
Steigleder’s interpretation of what I call the thesis of analyticity. – Many thanks to
Richard Capobianco andAlexander Cotter for checking my English.
2 Cf. Schönecker (2001); cf. also Damschen / Schönecker (2006).
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ple ofmorality” (GMS, 392).This ‘supreme principle’ is the categorical
imperative (CI). It is generally agreed upon that the ‘search for’ the
CI, i.e. its conceptual analysis, takes place in GMS I/II, whereas its 
‘establishment’ is to be found in GMS III. To be more precise, this
‘establishment’ is in the answer that Kant provides to the question of
‘how is a categorical imperative possible?’ This question is fi rst raised
in GMS I (GMS, 417 ff.), and then again in GMS II, 425; its answer,
however, is postponed to Sec. 4 of GMS III, the heading of which is
again that question of how a categorical imperative is possible. There
is no doubt that the answer to this question is what Kant himself calls 
a “deduction” (GMS, 447,22; 454,21; 463,21); the second paragraph of
Sec. 4 begins with the formulation “And thus categorical imperatives 
are possible …” (GMS, 454,6, m.e.).
Before we move on, it is important to realize two crucial structural
elements of the text. First, Kant clearly states at the end of Sec. 1 that
he cannot yet or immediately provide an answer to the question of how
a categorical imperative is possible; rather, he says, this “still needs 
some preparation” (GMS, 447,25). Since the central question “How is
a categorical imperative possible?” is indeed the heading of Sec. 4, it is
only natural to assume thatSec. 2 andSec. 3 provide that ‘preparation’,
whereas the actual answer, then, is given in Sec. 4. (As wewill see, this
also fits very wellwithwhat really happens in those sections.)
The second structural element relates to what I callKant’s thesis of
analyticity. In Sec. 1, Kant puts it as follows:
a free will and a will under moral laws are the same. [paragraph] Thus if
freedom of thewill is presupposed, then morality follows together with its
principle from mere analysis of its concept (GMS, 447,6–10).
This thesis has been widely misunderstood; as a result, Kant’s overall
argument (deduction) in GMS III has been misunderstood too (often
not recognized at all, as a matter of fact). His overall argument in
GMS III always has been reconstructed as follows:A freewill is awill
under the moral law; freedom must be presupposed as a quality of the
will of all rational beings; human beings are rational beings; therefore,
the human will as a free will is under the moral law, which is to say
the categorical imperative is valid.3 Since premise 1 is proven in Sec. 1,
premise 2 is argued for in Sec. 2 and premise 3 in Sec. 3,4 the answer
3 Cf. for instanceWood (1999, pp. 171–176).
4 As a matter of fact, the claim that ‘freedom must be presupposed as a quality of the
will of all rational beings’ is the heading of Sec. 2; Sec. 3 relates this to human beings
in particular.
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to the question of “how is a categorical imperative possible?” and thus
the deduction would already be given in Sec. 3. However, we already
noticed that there is a fourth section the very heading ofwhich is “how
is a categorical imperative possible?”, and it is only in this section that
Kant provides the deduction. If the standard interpretation of the the-
sis of analyticity and the deduction were correct, then the deduction
would be completed by the end of Sec. 3.
Clearly, Kant’s thesis of analyticity cannot mean that sensuous-ra-
tional beings (beings, like human beings, that are both sensuous and
rational),who have a freewill, always act morally; for that is obviously
not the case. However, it also cannot mean that the free will of such a
sensuous-rational being is “under” (GMS, 447,7) the moral law if this
is taken to mean that sensuous-rational beings are obligated by the
categorical imperative. They are indeed, but that they are obligated is
something that Kant after Sec. 1 and 2 has yet to demonstrate. After 
all, this is why he still raises the following question after he has argued
for his thesis of analyticity (Sec. 1) and the claim that freedom must be
presupposed as a quality of thewill of all rational beings (Sec. 2): “But
why ought I to subject myself to this [moral] principle …?” (GMS,
449,11). In Sec. 3, Kant still asks “from whence the moral law obli-
gates” (450,16), a question to which “no satisfactory answer” (GMS,
450,2) has been given yet (i. e. up to Sec. 3). This second structural
observation also implies that a free will and a will under moral laws
(under the CI) are not ‘the same’; that they ought to be is what the de-
duction has to prove, and that is why the deduction is yet to come after 
Sec. 2/3. What exactly this question (‘from whence does the moral law
obligate?’) means, is hard to say and indeed a source of confusion for
Kant himself. In any event, it is a question thatKant holds to be unans-
wered, and this along with the first observation that Sec. 2 and 3 are
only a ‘preparation’ for the answer to the question of how a categori-
cal imperative is possible renders the standard interpretation of the
thesis of analyticity untenable.
So how arewe to understandKant’s thesis of analyticity? Through-
outGMS I/II,Kant repeatedly argues that for a perfectly rational and
free being the moral law is not an imperative. Rather, the moral law
must be understood as a rule that these beings necessarily follow. Or
as Kant puts it:With regard to perfectly rational and free beings the
moral law is not a synthetic, but an analytic proposition. Analyzing
the very concept of a free and rational being yields the insight that the
(concept of the) moral law is included in it. One could also say that
the moral law describes what these beings do: By their very nature
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perfectly rational beings always act morally. There are many passages
that prove this point (some of which can actually be found in GMS
III). A famous one in GMS II reads as follows:
If reason determines the will without exception [unausbleiblich], then the
actions of such a being, which are recognized as objectively necessary,
are also subjectively necessary, i.e. the will is a faculty of choosing only
that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically
necessary, i.e., as good (GMS, 412,30–35).
Since human beings don’t have such a perfectly rational being, to them
the moral law is a categorical imperative or, as Kant puts it, a synthetic
proposition a priori. The categorical imperative is
a practical proposition thatdoesnotderive thevolition ofan actionanalytically
from any other volition already presupposed (for wehave no such perfect will),
but is immediately connectedwith the concept of thewill of a rational being,
as something not contained in it (GMS, 420,32–35,Fn., m.e.).
Willing the good action is not necessarily ‘contained’ in the volition of
a sensuous-rational being, i.e. it cannot be ‘analytically derived’ from 
the volition of such a being. That is why, in contrast to a pure will, the
CI does not follow by ‘mere analysis’ (GMS, 447,9) of the concept of
freedom of such a sensuous-rational being. So when Kant in his thesis
of analyticity states that ‘a freewill and awill under moral laws are the
same’ and that ‘morality follows together with its principle from mere
analysis of the concept of the freedom of the will’ (GMS, 447,6–10),
all he really says is this:A perfectly rational and free will always wills 
morally. Such a will must be understood as the will of an actually holy
being; or (as wewill see) it must be understood as the intelligiblewill of
a being that is both a member of the empirical and intelligibleworld.
The argumentative structure of GMS III strongly supports this
reading. After Kant has presented his solution to the notorious circle
in Sec. 3, he concludes:
For now we see that if we think of ourselves as free, then we transport
ourselves as members into the world of understanding and cognize the
autonomy of the will, together with its consequence, morality; but if we
think of ourselves as obligated by duty, then we consider ourselves as be-
longing to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the world of
understanding (GMS, 453,11–15).
It is highly remarkable that Kant does not contrast the formulation ‘if
we think of ourselves as free’ with ‘ifwe think of ourselves as not free.’
Rather, he contrasts it with ‘if we think of ourselves as obligated by
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duty.’ The counterpoint to freedom is not the absence or lack of free-
dom, but duty. Since morality without freedom is not thinkable for
Kant, freedom understood as a counterpoint to duty cannot be identi-
calwith the freedom presupposed by morality for beings that are both
sensuous and rational. Freedom as the counterpoint to duty must be
understood as the quality of awill that is completely rational and free. 
However, a being that is ‘obligated by duty’ must be free, too. There-
fore, to think of oneself as ‘obligated by duty’ implies to consider one-
self ‘as belonging to the world of sense’, but it also means to consider
oneself ‘at the same time (“zugleich”,GMS, 453,15) as belonging to the
world of understanding’.5 Hence the first part of the passage quoted
above (GMS, 453,11–13) really is nothing but a reformulation of the
thesis of analyticity. The second part after the semi-colon, however,
makes clear why for sensuous-rational beings the moral law is an im-
perative and hence duty.6
The thesis of analyticity also shows up in the deduction found in
Sec. 4 which we will address in great detail later: “As a mere member
of the world of understanding, all my actions would be perfectly in
accord with the principle of the autonomy of the pure will” (GMS,
453,25–27, m.e.). A bit later it says: “And thus categorical imperatives 
are possible through the fact that the idea of freedom makes me into a
member of an intelligibleworld, throughwhich, if I were that alone, all
my actions would always be in accord with the autonomy of the will”
(GMS, 454,6–9, m.e.). Again, at the end of the Sec. 4 Kant concludes:
“The moral ‘ought’ is thus his own necessary volition as a member of
5 On the “zugleich” cf. also GMS, 454,9 and 462,31.
6 The passage just quoted (‘For now we see … world of understanding’,GMS, 453,11–
15) is Kant’s final answer to the problem of the notorious “circle” (GMS 450,18; 
453,4) in Sec. 3. This ‘circle’ is yet another issue I cannot address here (cf. Schö-
necker, 1999, pp. 317–358).However, let me state that its correct understanding must
begin with the insight that for Kant there is a difference between a petitio principii
and a circulus in probando, and that the aforementioned ‘circle’ is an “Erbittung
eines Prinzips” (GMS 453,9), not a vicious circle (‘Erbittung eines Prinzips’ is Kant’s
translation of the Latin phrase ‘petitio principii, i.e. ‘begging the question’). What
is still missing in Sec. 3 (just begged for) is the rationale for the human being’s belief
in the idea of freedom as well as the justification for the categorical imperative. So
what Kant actually does to remove the suspicion of the petitio is, first, to show how
and why the human being can understand himself as a member of the intelligible
world and therefore as free. Second, Kant’s discussion of the petitio – and his fi nal
solution of it at the end of Sec. 3 – also draws our attention to a problem which is
equally important, to wit, that by the thesis of analyticity the validity of the categori-
cal imperative has not been demonstrated; as a matter of fact, the common misun-
derstanding of Kant’s overall argument in GMS III is exactly what Kant warns his 
readers against. –On the ‘circle’ also cf. Quarfood’s paper in this volume.
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an intelligible world and is thought of by him as an ‘ought’ only inso-
far as he at the same time considers himself as a member of the sen-
sible world” (GMS, 455,7–9, m.e.). And to quote yet another passage:
“Under the presupposition of freedom of thewill of an intelligence, its
autonomy, as the formal condition under which alone it can be deter-
mined, is a necessary consequence” (GMS, 461,14–17).
Kant describes an ‘intelligence’ as a rational being that considers
itself solely as a member of theworld of understanding. Thus, the ‘will’ 
in the context of the thesis of analyticity cannot simply be understood
as the will of a sensuous-rational being. It must be understood either
as the will of a perfectly rational being, whose free will always is a
good will; or, with an eye on human beings, it must be understood as
the will of a sensuous-rational being, whose will is both part of the
‘world of sense’ (“Sinnenwelt”) and of the ‘world of understanding’
(“Verstandeswelt”), whose will, however, as part of the latter world, is
“the idea of reason, which would have full control over all subjective
motivations” (GMS, 420,31, m.e.). It is exactly in this sense that in
the context of the deduction proper (Sec. 4), Kant writes that the cat-
egorical ‘ought’ “represents a synthetic proposition a priori by the fact
that my to will affected through sensible desires there is also added
the idea of precisely the same will, but one belonging to the world of
understanding, a pure will, practical for itself” (GMS, 454,11, second
emphasis mine). In this perspective the human being, too, considers
his will as free, and such a free will always wills the good (‘all actions 
would be perfectly in accord with the principle of the autonomy of the
pure will’). This is the meaning of Kant’s thesis of analyticity.7
Thus Kant writes right after stating the thesis of analyticity:
Nonetheless, the latter is always a synthetic proposition: an absolutely
goodwill is that whose maxim can always contain itself considered as uni-
versal law, for through analysis of the concept of an absolutely good will
that quality of the maxim cannot be found. (GMS, 447,10–14)
With the ‘nonetheless’ (“Indessen”) Kant sets off the syntheticity
of the CI from the analyticity of the “principle of morality” (GMS,
447,6) just mentioned in the sentence before. Whereas this ‘principle’ 
“follows […] from mere analysis” (GMS, 447,8–9) of the concept of
freedom, from the analysis of the concept ‘of an absolutely good will’ 
it does not follow (‘cannot be found’) that ‘its maxim can always con-
7 I cannot discuss here Kant’s repeated claim that the categorical imperative is a syn-
thetic proposition; in any event, Iwould hold that, strictly speaking, it does not make
sense.
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tain itself considered as universal law’, i.e. that such a will is always
good. And this means, first, that in the last passage quoted above the
sentence after the colon (‘an absolutely good will …’) is a synthetic
proposition; for after the colon the reason is given for why the ‘analy-
sis’ cannot take place which implies that we are, indeed, dealing with
a synthetcial proposition rather than an analytic one. Second, one has 
to behold that the ‘concept of an absolutely good will’ here does not
refer to the will of a perfectly rational being; for if one analyzes such
a concept, it does follow that ‘its maxim can always contain itself con-
sidered as universal law’. 8
In light of these considerations,what then does the question of how
a categorical imperative is possible really mean? Lack of space does
not allow to go into any analysis of the quite obvious parallel that
Kant likes to draw between the famous theoretical question of how
synthetic propositions a priori are possible. In any event, a closer look
reveals that the parallel question “How is a categorical imperative
possible?” actually includes three questions or aspects:
1. Why is the CI valid (binding, obligatory)?
2. How can freedom be understood, and why may we consider our-
selves to be free?
3. How can pure practical reason bring about an interest in the moral
law?
The third question cannot be answered.9 The second question is ans-
wered in Sec. 2 and Sec. 3 ofGMS III: In Sec. 1,Kant fi rst argues that
a perfectly rational and free will always wills (acts) morally. Sec. 2
demonstrates that because of its ability to think spontaneously (free-
ly), a rational being must also consider itself practically free; Sec. 3
then refers to the difference between the world of understanding and
8 From early on this passage and especially the (formulation of the) ‘concept of an
absolutely good will’ has tremendously contributed to the misunderstandings of the
thesis of analyticity (cf. the report on the secondary literature in Schönecker, 1999,
168–171). For Kant does indeed avail himself of this ‘concept of an absolutely good
will’ to refer to a perfectly rational (‘holy’) will (cf. GMS, 439,29–34). However, he
also refers to an imperfect will as ‘absolutely good’: “That will is absolutely good
which cannot be evil, hence whose maxim, if it is made into a universal law, can nev-
er conflict with itself“ (GMS, 437,6). In this passage and context Kant clearly does
not talk about perfectly rational (holy) beings. He refers to the will as ‘absolutely
good’ only insasmuch its (particular) maxim can be universalized; cf. GMS, 426,10; 
437,24; 437,32; 444,28.
9 In Sec. 5 Kant provides a lengthy justification for his claim that the question of how
a categorical imperative is possible can only be answered partially: “Thus the ques-
tion, ‘How is a categorical imperative possible?’ can be answered to this extent: …:
(GMS, 461,7, m.e.); what cannot be answered is the question of how pure practical
reason indeed can be practical (cf. GMS 458,37; 459,34; 460,10; 461,25, 461,32).
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the world of sense in order to argue that the human being also must
understand himself as practically free. But then, it seems, Kant still
thinks that the answer to that crucial question is still not answered;
recall that Kant in Sec. 3 still asks “from whence the moral law obli-
gates” (GMS, 450,16), a question that is not answered in Sec. 3 itself. 
For now, I will leave it open what exactly it is that question is asking
for; as we will see later, Kant himself seems not to be entirely clear 
about its meaning. In any event, what is needed is somehow the proof
that the CI is really valid, i.e. really binding on us.As long as this has
not been shown, morality could very well be a “figment of the mind” 
(GMS, 407,17, 445,8); I will come back to this later.
2. The deduction of the categorical imperative
Sec. 4, then, raises our crucial question again and finally answers it. 
This section is broken down into three paragraphs. In the fi rst par-
agraph, Kant offers the argument proper. In the second paragraph,
Kant provides the final answer to the question of how categorical im-
peratives are possible (“And thus categorical imperatives are possible
…” GMS, 454,6). Paragraph three comes back to ‘common rational
moral cognition’ (something mentioned at the end of the preface); I
will not discuss it here.
2.1 Presuppositions of the deduction
Let me now quote the first four sentences of Sec. 4:
The rational being counts himself as intelligence in the world of under-
standing, and merely as an efficient cause belonging to this world does
it call its causality a will. From the other side, however, it is conscious of
itself also as a piece of the world of sense, in which its actions, as mere
appearances of that causality are encountered, but whose possibility from 
the latter, with which we have no acquaintance, is something into which
we can have no insight, but rather in place of that we have to have insight
into those actions as determined through other appearances, namely de-
sires and inclinations as belonging to the world of sense. As a mere mem-
ber of the world of understanding, all my actions would be perfectly in ac-
cordwith the principle of the autonomy of the purewill; as a mere piece of
the sensible world, they would have to be taken as entirely in accord with
the natural law of desires and inclinations, hence with the heteronomy of
nature. (The former would rest on the supreme principle of morality, the
second on that of happiness.) (GMS, 453, 17)
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These lines are basically a summary of what Kant has said about
freedom and morality in Sec. 1–3, and so they are also a summary of
his thesis of analyticity. Using Kant’s own words of paragraphs 9–12
(GMS, 452,7–453,15), the gist of it is this: ‘Now the human being ac-
tually finds in himself a faculty, and this faculty is reason as a faculty
of pure spontaneity (self-activity). On account of this, a rational be-
ing has to regard itself as an intelligence (thus not from the side of its 
lower powers), as belonging not to the world of sense but to the world
of understanding. As a rational being, hence one belonging to the in-
telligible world, the human being can never think of the causality of
his own will otherwise than under the idea of freedom. Now, with the
idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is inseparably bound up, and
with the latter the universal principle of morality. If we think of our-
selves as free, then we transport ourselves as members into the world
of understanding and cognize the autonomy of the will, together with
its consequence, morality; but if we think of ourselves as obligated by
duty, then we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense
and yet at the same time to the world of understanding.’ –Again, par-
agraph 1 of Sec. 4 is nothing but a recapitulation of these basic ideas.
I will now present them in several theses (D1–4).
Thesis 1 states that every human being must understand itself as a
rational being:
(D1) The human being finds in itself the faculty of reason, which, as an
epistemic faculty, is a faculty of pure spontaneity.
It is important to see that Kant’s argument both in Sec. 3 and Sec. 4
begins with reason as a theoretical (epistemic) faculty. Only on pain
of self-contradiction, he argues, one can deny that one has reason, for
denying that one does presupposes that one does.10 The activity of
reason is self-activity, spontaneity, freedom, and these qualities justify
the human being to understand himself ‘as an intelligence.’And as an
intelligence, the human being must understand himself as a member
of the world of understanding.
(D2) As a rational being, a human being must understand himself as an
intelligence and, in this perspective, as a member of the world of under-
standing.
It is important to say ‘in this perspective’ because only as an intel-
ligence, and inasmuch a human being is an intelligence, he may con-
10 Cf. Schönecker (1999, pp. 196–316); here it is important to take into account Kant’s
Review of Schulz’s Attempt at Introduction to a Doctrine ofMorals (1783).
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Leipzig
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.04.16 21:05
310 Dieter Schönecker
sider himself as a member of the world of understanding. Once the
human being understands himself as a member of the world of under-
standing because of his theoretical faculty, he also may understand his 
reason as a practical faculty, i.e. he may understand his will to be a
member of the world of understanding and hence to be free.11
(D3) As a rational being, hence as a being belonging to the world of un-
derstanding, the human being must understand the causality of his will
under the idea of freedom.
Here it shows how important a proper understanding of the thesis of
analyticity is. For what that thesis claims is exactly that the principle
of morality is ‘inseparably bound up’ with freedom.
(D4) Since the moral law is analytically bound up with freedom as a prop-
erty of the will of a rational being that is a member of the world of under-
standing, the human being also may understand his autonomy and the
moral law as the law of his rational volition, inasmuch as he understands 
himself as such a rational being that is a member of the world of under-
standing.
Again, it is of utmost importance to realize that with this move the
validity of the moral law as a categorical imperative has not been dem-
onstrated. All that has been shown so far is that the will of a human 
11 Cf. GMS, 448,13–22.: “Now one cannot possibly think a reason that, in its own
consciousness, would receive steering from elsewhere in regard to its judgments; 
for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its power of judgment not
to its reason but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles 
independently of alien influences, consequently it must, as practical reason or as
the will of a rational being, be regarded by itself as free, i.e. the will of a rational
being can be a will of its own only under the idea of freedom and must therefore
with a practical aim be attributed to all rational beings” (m.e.). How are we to read
‘consequently’? The transition from the thinking I to the willing (acting) I only
appears plausible if the reason, the freedom of which cannot be denied without a
performative contradiction, is the very same reason that also is practical. ThatKant
actually has something like this in mind shows in a thought of his from the preface.
There he says that “it can in the end be only one and the same reason that is dis-
tinguished merely in its application” (GMS, 391,27, m.e.). Kant calls this a “unity” 
(GMS, 391,25) between theoretical and practical reason “in a common principle“ 
(GMS, 391,26). Only if this unity is comprehensively exhibited, Kant continues, a
‘critique of pure practical reason’ can be ventured and this is something, he says, he
could not do in theGroundwork. However, the truth of the matter is that in chapter 
three a transition to such a ‘critique of pure practical reason’ does take place, if only
its “main feature” (GMS, 445,15) is exhibited. But there is no argument whatsoever 
for that alleged unity or identity of theoretical and practical reason.How this unity
is to be understood, how Kant moves from the freedom to think to the freedom to
will, and how from the concept of an intelligence to the concept of an intelligence
with a will – we are left in the dark.
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being, considered merely as a member of the world of understanding,
is analytically bound up with the moral law. This is whyKant writes in
Sec. 4 ofGMS III (453 f.) that all actions of a human being, if he were
only a member of the world of understanding, ‘would be perfectly in
accord with the principle of the autonomy of the pure will’; if a hu-
man being were ‘alone’ a member of the world of understanding, all
his actions ‘would always be in accord with the autonomy of the will’.
That autonomy and hence morality is a ‘consequence’, as Kant puts
it several times, is only true “under the presupposition of freedom of
the will of an intelligence” (GMS, 461,14, m.e.).12 For only “as intel-
ligence” (GMS, 453,17, m.e.) does a human being understand himself
as a member of the world of understanding. In Sec. 5Kant argues that
the human being must “think of him[self] as intelligence, also as thing
in itself” (GMS, 459,22) and hence of himself as the “authentic self” 
(“eigentliches Selbst”,GMS, 457,34, m.e.). As an ‘authentic self’, a hu-
man bing gives himself the law. And so morality is that which the hu-
man being, in some sense and respect, ‘authentically wills’. That’s why
the moral ought is “eigentlich ein Wollen” (‘really a volition’, GMS,
449,16, m.e.;), and that’s why it is “his own necessary volition as a
member of an intelligible world” (GMS, 455,7, m.e.); I will come back
to this latter thought momentarily.
2.2 The ontoethical principle
Let me now quote the passage (both in German and in English) that
is at the center of the deduction:
Weil aber die Verstandeswelt den Grund der Sinnenwelt, mithin auch der 
Gesetze derselben, enthält, also in Ansehung meines Willens (der ganz
zur Verstandeswelt gehört) unmittelbar gesetzgebend ist, und also auch
als solche gedacht werden muß, so werde ich mich als Intelligenz, obgleich
andererseits wie ein zur Sinnenwelt gehöriges Wesen, dennoch dem Ge-
setze der ersteren, d. i. der Vernunft, die in der Idee der Freiheit das Ge-
setz derselben enthält, und also der Autonomie des Willens unterworfen 
erkennen, folglich die Gesetze der Verstandeswelt für mich als Impera-
tive und die diesem Prinzip gemäßen Handlungen als Pflichten ansehen 
müssen. (GMS, 453,31–454,5)
But because the world of understanding contains the ground of the
world of sense, hence also of its laws, hence is immediately legislative in
regard to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of understanding),
and hence must also be thought of wholly as such, therefore as intelli-
12 The words “of an intelligence” are missing in Wood’s translation.
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gence I will cognize myself, though on the other side as a being belonging
to theworld of sense, as nevertheless subject to the laws of the first, i.e., to 
reason, which in the idea of freedom contains the law of the understand-
ing’s world, and thus to autonomy of the will; consequently I must regard
the laws of the world of understanding for myself as imperatives and the
actions that accord with this principle as duties. (GMS, 453,31–454,5)
An analysis of this sentence is quite tiresome; it is most important,
however, because it contains what I call the ontoethical principle
(OP). So please bear with me; also, keep in mind that we have to do
this referring to the English translation.
Let’s first understand the grammatical structure of this elusive sen-
tence. The elements ‘because-therefore’ break down the sentence into
two parts, the first of which obviously provides a reason (‘because’)
for a conclusion drawn in the second (‘therefore’).13 Abstracting as
much as we can from the actual content of what is being said, the fi rst
passage of the first part says, grammatically speaking, this:
(OP1) The world of understanding contains the ground of the world of
sense.
Grammatically speaking, there is no problem with this part. Recon-
structing the next element of the sentence is also rather compelling
(although the ‘hence’ will deserve more attention later):
(OP2) Hence the world of understanding also contains the ground of the
laws of the world of sense.
Now, one might think that because of the relationship between the
world of understanding and the world of sense laid out in OP1 and
OP2, the world of understanding is also ‘immediately legislative in
regard to my will’ and ‘hence must also be thought of wholly as such’ 
(i.e. as ‘immediately legislative’). As we will see, that cannot be true.
Rather, a correct understanding is as follows:
(OP3) In regard to my will, which belongs wholly to the world of under-
standing, the world of understanding is immediately legislative and must
also, in regard to my will, be thought of such that it (the world of under-
standing) contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws.
Already for grammatical reasons, the first part of this reconstruction
cannot be disputed: ‘In regard to my will, which belongs wholly to
13 The translation of the German “folglich” (GMS, 454,4) with “consequently” (and
the preceding colon) can be misleading. The “folglich” functions as an explanation 
or elucidation rather than a ‘consequence’ in any stricter sense; I’ll come back to
this later.
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the world of understanding, the world of understanding is immedi-
ately legislative’.What is problematic here is the relation of this part of
OP3 to OP1 and OP2, or to be more precise, problematic is both the
function of the conjunction ‘because’ at the beginning of OP1 (‘But
because …’) as well as the function of the adverb ‘hence’ at the begin-
ning of what we have reconstructed as OP3 (‘hence is immediately
legislative …’). Clearly, it would make no sense to interpret Kant as
arguing that the world of understanding contains the ground of the
world of sense and the ground of its laws and therefore (‘hence’) were
immediately legislative for thewill; it would not, because this very will
already ‘belongs wholly to the world of understanding’ anyway and
not to the world of sense. However, this problem of interpretation can 
be solved by pointing out that the ‘because’ at the beginning of the
whole sentence must be put (and read) also at the beginning of OP3,
such that one must read: ‘Because the world of understanding also in
regard to my will, which belongs wholly to the world of understand-
ing, is immediately legislative …’. The will is part of the world of un-
derstanding, and for this world of understanding it is true (according
to OP1 andOP2), that it contains the ground of theworld of sense and
the ground of its laws. In what follows, Kant again avails himself (as 
he did with the ‘because’) of an ellipsis; what is left out is ‘in regard
to my will’. The alleged fact that the will ‘belongs wholly to the world
of understanding’ entails that the world of understanding ‘must also 
be thought of wholly as such’; that is, however, not as a world which is
immediately legislative – for this is clear anyway since thewill belongs 
to the world of understanding – but as a world for which it is ‘also’ 
true in regard to the will as part of it, that it contains the ground of
the world of sense and its laws. Thus we get: ‘It is also true in regard
to the will as part of the world of understanding that this will contains
the ground of the world of sense and its laws’. As we will see later, it
is indeed the crux of Kant’s deduction that the pure will as a member
of theworld of understanding contains the moral law as an imperative
for this very will as a member of the world of sense.
So we must reconstruct the first part of that sentence as follows:
(OP1–3) Because the world of understanding contains the ground of the
world of sense; and because hence the world of understanding also con-
tains the ground of the laws of the world of sense; and because hence the
world of understanding also in regard to my will, which belongs wholly to
the world of understanding, is immediately legislative and must also, in
regard to my will, be thought of such that it (the world of understanding)
contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws …
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The second part of the crucial sentence (GMS, 453,35–454,5) is easier
to digest, yet still not a piece of cake. Let’s look at it again: ‘…therefore
as intelligence I will cognize myself, although on the other side as a
being belonging to the world of sense, as nevertheless subject to the
laws of the first, i.e. to reason, which in the idea of freedom contains
the law of the understanding’s world, and thus to autonomy of thewill; 
consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding for
myself as imperatives and the actions that accord with this principle
as duties.’ It is broken down into two parts: The first part (in its Eng-
lish translation, of course) runs from ‘therefore as’ to ‘autonomy of the
will;’ the second from ‘consequently’ to the end (‘as duties’).One might
think that Kant in the first part Kant says mainly something like this:
‘therefore as intelligence Iwill cognize myself […] as […] subject to the
laws of the first, i.e. to reason, which in the idea of freedom contains
the law of the understanding’sworld, and thus to autonomy of thewill’.
Thus one might think that what is stated in the omitted part (‘although
on the other side as a being belonging to the world of sense, as never-
theless …’) only becomes relevant in the later second part, because the
human being as such a being (that belongs to the world of sense) re-
gards the laws as imperatives.However, I submit that the human being
in the entire second part of the ontoethical principle (sentence) must
be understood as a being that does not ‘as intelligence’ cognize himself
‘subject’ to the law of theworld of understanding and the autonomy of
thewill; rather it does so ‘as intelligence, although on the other side as a
being belonging to theworld of sense.’ Three reasons speak in favor of
this reading: First, that’s what it says –why put that insertion at the end
of the sentence? In a number of parallel passages Kant also emphasizes
the ‘simultaneity’ of both perspectives with regard to the imperative
character of the moral law. Secondly, inasmuch as the human being
considers himself merely as intelligence, he does not cognize himself
as ‘subject to’ the moral law; that’s part of the meaning of the thesis of
analyticity. This concept of a being that is subject to the moral law is,
strictly speaking, reserved for sensual-rational beings; inasmuch as the
human being considers himself as intelligence, he considers oneself
‘merely as a member of the world of understanding’. Thirdly (and re-
lated to the last point), it is striking thatKant says that the human being
cognizes himself ‘as nevertheless (‘obgleich’) subject to’ the moral law.
For a being that considers itself only as intelligence, there is no need
to consider itself as ‘nevertheless’ subject to the moral law – for what
kind of difference could the ‘nevertheless’ indicate if not the difference
between being a member of the world of understanding and the world
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of sense?14Also, the ‘consequently’ (‘folglich’) only makes sense if it is
related to that insertion.
With regard to the first part of the ‘consequently’-sentence, I’d like
to emphasize this. The ‘first’ (‘ersteren’) can only refer to the world
of understanding at the beginning of the sentence; in the later part of
the sentence the ‘laws’ of that ‘world of understanding’ are mentioned
again. However, Kant connects the ‘first’ with the concept of ‘reason’
(‘Vernunft’) by means of an ‘i. e.’, and since the German ‘derselben’
cannot refer back to this very ‘reason’, one must read: ‘… to the law
of reason, which in the idea of freedom contains the law of the under-
standing’s world.’ Kant then also mentions the ‘autonomy of the will’,
and from all of this it follows that I cognize myself as subject to (1.)
the law of the world of understanding, (2.) to reason which contains in
the idea of freedom the law of the world of understanding, and (3.) to
the autonomy of the will. Thus we can reconstruct the first part of the
‘therefore’-sentence as follows:
(OP4) Understanding myself as a being belonging both to the world of
understanding (intelligence) and to the world of sense, I cognize myself as
subject to the law of the world of understanding, i.e. to reason, which in
the idea of freedom contains the law of the world of understanding, and
thus as subject to the autonomy of the will.
The rest of the sentence is easy. It, too, makes clear that the moral law,
which describes the volition of perfectly rational beings, is an impera-
tive for sensuous-rational beings:
(OP5) I must regard the laws of the world of understanding for myself as
imperatives and the actions that accord with this principle as duties.
Connecting these elements and adding the conjunctive particles, we
thus get the ontoethical principle:
(OP) Because the world of understanding contains the ground of the
world of sense; and because hence the world of understanding also con-
tains the ground of the laws of the world of sense; and because hence the
world of understanding also in regard to my will, which belongs wholly to
the world of understanding, is immediately legislative and must also, in
regard to my will, be thought of such that it (the world of understanding)
contains the ground of the world of sense and its laws, I cognize myself
– understanding myself as a being belonging both to the world of under-
standing (intelligence) and to the world of sense – as subject to the law of
14 Cf. the elucidating parallel in GMS, 450,12–13 (“… consider ourselves as free in
acting and thus nevertheless take ourselves to be subject to certain laws …”, m.e.).
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the world of understanding, i.e. to reason, which in the idea of freedom
contains the law of the world of understanding, and thus as subject to the
autonomy of the will. Consequently, Imust regard the laws of the world of
understanding for myself as imperatives and the actions that accord with
this principle as duties.15
Thus the deduction of the categorical imperative is completed in just
one sentence. This deduction is Kant’s answer to the question of how
a categorical imperative is possible. Therefore, it is no surprise that
right after statingOP,Kant officially gives the answer to that question 
as well:
And thus categorical imperatives are possible through the fact that the
idea of freedom makes me into a member of an intelligibleworld, through
which, if I were that alone, all my actions would always be in accord with
the autonomy of the will; but since I intuit myself at the same time as
member of the world of sense, they ought to be in accord with it, which
categorical ‘ought’ represents a synthetic proposition a priori by the fact
that to my will affected through sensible desires there is also added the
idea of precisely the same will, but one belonging to the world of under-
standing, a pure will, practical for itself, that contains the supreme condi-
tion of the first in accordance with reason (GMS, 454,6–15, m.e.).
Clearly, the deduction is not a deduction in any strict (deductive) sense
(at least not as long as the reconstruction sticks to the original text).
What then, exactly, is the key idea in Kant’s argument? The human 
being is aware of himself as an intelligence due to the spontaneous 
epistemic activities of his reason and understanding; as such an intel-
ligence, the human being is the ‘eigentliche Selbst’ (‘authentic self’;
GMS, 457,34; 458,2; 461,4). From there, Kant goes on (“folglich”;
GMS, 448,18) to the ‘intelligence with a will’. Considering himself as
an intelligence, the human being understands himself as a member of
the world of understanding and thus as a thing in itself; its rational
will, then, constitutes the ‘eigentliche Selbst’ as a practical being. This
idea – again, that the will as an intelligible faculty is the ‘eigentliche
Selbst’ of the human being, as opposed to the human being inasmuch
as he is “only appearance of himself” (GMS, 457,35, m.e.), i.e. only a
“phenomenon in theworld of sense“ (GMS, 457,13) – is the core ofOP. 
Kant argues for the validity of the categorical imperative as a moral
15 Cf. R 5086: „In der Verstandeswelt ist das substratum: intelligentz, die Handlung
und Ursache: Freyheit, die Gemeinschaft: Glückseligkeit aus Freyheit, das Urwe-
sen: eine Intelligentz durch idee; die form: moralitaet, der nexus: ein nexus der 
Zweke. Diese Verstandeswelt liegt schon itzt der Sinnenwelt zum Grunde und ist
das wahre selbstandige“ (m.e., andereHervorhebungen getilgt).
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law for sensual-rational beings with the superiority of the ontic status
of the world of understanding. The human being as a thing in itself and
hence the ‘eigentliche Selbst’ and its law is of higher ontic value then
the human being as an appearance; and this is why the law of theworld
of understanding (the moral law) is binding upon the human being (as 
a categorical imperative) who is a member both of the world of under-
standing and theworld of sense. That’s the basic idea behindOP.
That this is, indeed, the basic idea behind OP can hardly be seen
just by readingOP itself (that sentence in GMS, 453).We have to look
at other passages.An external characteristic may lead theway: In that
passage in GMS, 453,OP1 andOP2 are emphasized, an emphasis that
at this length, as far as I know, hardly ever can be found in Kant’s writ-
ings (if at all). Exactly parallel to this,Kant again provides the answer
to the question of how a categorical imperative is possible in GMS,
461. And just as in GMS, 453 f., he again avails himself of a lengthy
emphasis to stress that the moral law
is valid [!] for us as [!] human beings, since [!] it has arisen from our will as
intelligence, hence from our authentic self; but what belongs to the mere
appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the constitution of
the thing in itself (GMS, 461,2–6).
The law of the world of appearances is the “natural law of desires and
inclinations” (GMS, 453,28); these ‘desires and inclinations’, as “ap-
pearances” (GMS, 453,24, m.e.), determine human actions.However,
this law just belongs ‘to the mere appearance’ and therefore ‘is neces-
sarily subordinated by reason to the constitution of the thing in itself’.
Here again it becomes clear that the whole force of Kant’s argument
depends on the ontic superiority of the ‘authentic self’.
And there is yet another passage that provides textual evidence for
this interpretation. The human being, Kant says, as a rational being is
a member of the world of understanding, and
since in that world he himself only as intelligence is the authentic self
(as human being, by contrast, only appearance of himself), those laws [of
the world of understanding] apply to him immediately and categorically
(GMS, 457,33–36, m.e.)
In other words, the moral law is binding upon the human being be-
cause it stems from the pure will as the authentic self, which, as such,
is of higher ontic value (not ‘only appearance of himself’). Even in the
Critique of Practical Reason, in which Kant denies the possibility of
a deduction of the categorical imperative, he says that it is the status
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as a member of the world of understanding which “elevates a human 
being above himself (as a part of the sensible world)“ (KpV, 86, m.e.);
hence “it is not to be wondered at that a human being, as belonging
to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to his second
and highest vocation only with reference, and its laws with the highest
respect” (KpV, 87, m.e.). This, Kant says, is the “origin” (KpV, 86) of
duty. This axiological position is also reflected in the last paragraph
of Sec. 4 of the GMS, where Kant writes that “even the most wicked
scoundrel […] transports himself in thoughts into entirely another or-
der of things” (GMS, 454,21–31) in which he finds “a greater inner
worth of his person” (GMS, 454,37): “This better person, however, he
believes himself to be when he transports himself into the standpoint
of a member of the world of understanding” (GMS, 454,37–455,2)
Thus we can reconstruct the ontoethical principle as follows:
(OP*) The world of understanding and thus the pure will as a member of
this world of understanding are ontically superior to the world of sense,
and therefore the law of this world and will (the moral law) is binding as
a categorcial imperative for beings that are both members of the world of
understanding and the world of sense.16
16 Steigleder (2006, this volume, pp. 225–246) rejects my interpretation of Kant’s the-
sis of analyticity and therefore also my interpretation of Sec. 4. Although it would
be most interesting to have a detailed discussion, it is simply impossible to have it
here for lack of space. Hence just three brief comments: First, no interpretation can 
be satisfying that is not comprehensive; it’s always easy, too easy indeed, to make
claims about what a text means by ignoring those passages that don’t fit. (Thus,
Steigleder is right to point out that there are elements in Sec. 1 that pose a prob-
lem for my interpretation; I have addressed these elements in Schönecker, 1999.)
This being said, I’d like to reply, second, that Steigleder correctly points out that
my interpretation is partly based on the overall structure of GMS III (that at least
part ofGMS II andGMS III are ‘preparation’ and that there is a Sec. 4 – to say the
very least). However, it is certainly not sufficient to reply to this crucial element of
my interpretation by just asserting that there “may conceivably be other readings”
(Steigleder 2006, 242, m.e.) without actually providing an alternative reading that
is also in a position to account for the overall structure of GMS III. As did many
before him, Steigleder still argues that it is only Kant’s intention that we “must
necessarily see ourselves as ‘rational beings, which have a will’” (Steigleder, 2006,
p. 243). Clearly, however, this has been demonstrated no later than in Sec. 3. But
what then is the purpose of Sec. 4 and that long and complicated sentence that is (or 
includes) what I call the ontoethical principle? Steigleder provides no answer, and
it is therefore no surprise that in his book (2002, 67–96), Steigleder shows no inter-
est whatsoever in that sentence either (he does, however, very briefly mention that
the “Gesetz unserer Vernunft und das Verlangen unserer Bedürfnisse […] nicht
auf gleicher Stufe stehen”, p. 89, m.e.). There may very well be other readings of it; 
but whether there are any, we will not figure out by ignoring it. Leaving aside that
Steigleder, as I see it, pays no sufficient attention to Kant’s repeated claim that there
is no categorical imperative for perfectly rational beings and does not sufficiently
distinguish between the moral law as an ‘synthetic’ imperative and as an ‘analytical’
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2.3 Validity andMotivation
I already pointed out that, according to Kant, the good is something
which the human being, in some sense and respect, ‘authentically
wills’. I would now like to come back to this idea. Recall that the de-
duction of the categorical imperative is the answer to the question 
of how a categorical imperative is possible. This question, we said,
must be understood as the question of why the categorical impera-
tive is valid (binding, obligatory), or more simply: Is the CI valid? Is
there a good reason to abide by it? Kants himself asks ‘from whence
the moral law obligates’.17 Traditionally, this question has often been
formulated as the question ‘Why be moral?’, and this so-calledMoral
Question, I submit, can have only two possible answers:Either the an-
swer refers to self-interest, such that the reason why one ought to act
morally is that doing so serves one’s self-interest, at least in the long
run; or the answer is that indeed there is a moral law, or, in a rather
axiological language, that goodness does exist and makes demands on 
us, and that the moral law (or goodness) itself is the always overriding
reason to act morally.18
Clearly, the first answer is unacceptable to Kant. It is one ofKant’s
fundamental claims that the CI “does not have validity for us because
it interests us” (GMS, 460,24), and given Kant’s overall understand-
law (though this distinction is, obviously, at the very heart ofKant’s question of how
a categorical imperative is possible), I’d like to note, third, that Steigleder does not
have an explanation for Kant’s repeatedly posed question ‘from whence the moral
law obligates’. I do, by the way, agree that it is certainly worthwhile to consider the
option that Kant in the Groundwork already distinguishes, as Steigleder suggests,
between ‘Wille’ and ‘Willkür’; but again, this issue I cannot possibly address here.
17 In the preface Kant already mentions the Grund der Verbindlichkeit of the CI
(‘ground of an obligation’; cf. GMS, 389,12; 389,16; 391,11; 432,31; 439,31; 439,33; 
448,34). He also speaks of the Realität of the CI (reality; GMS, 425,14; 449,26), of
its Wirklichkeit (‘reality’; cf. vgl. 420,1; vgl. 406,15), Geltung (‘validity’; cf. GMS,
389,12; 389,14; 403,7; 408,18; 412,3; 424,35; 425,18; 442,8; 447,32; 448,6; 448,32; 
449,29; 460,25; 461,3; 461,12), Richtigkeit (‘correctness’; cf. GMS, 392,13), objek-
tiven Notwendigkeit (‘objective necessity’; cf. GMS 442,9; 449,26; 449,30); Kant
says that the CI gibt (is; cf. 419,18), that it wirklich stattfinde (‘is’; cf. GMS, 425,9)
and that the human being ought to unterwerfen himself to it (‘subject himself to it’;
cf. GMS, 449,12). All this concepts and formulations are probably best subsumed
under the idea of the Gültigkeit dieses Imperativs (‘validity of this imperative’;
cf. GMS 461,12). Also note that Kant not only speaks of the deduction of the CI,
but also of its ‘Beweis’ etc. (‘proof’; cf. GMS, 392,4; 392,13; 403,27; 412,2–8; 425,8;
425,15; 427,17; 431,33; 440,20–28; 445,1; 447,30–448,4; 449,27).
18 For our context, I assume that answers which could be classified as ‘formalistic’
(such as Karl-Otto Apel’s or Habermas’) fail from the word go; but they would clas-
sify as a third possible answer. On theMoral Question, cf. Schönecker (2006).
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Leipzig
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 05.04.16 21:05
320 Dieter Schönecker
ing of morality developed in GMS I/II, this question, if understood as
‘Why be moral?’, obviously cannot be asking for the utility of the CI; 
it cannot ask for how theCI might serve one’s interests. It is important
to see, though, that although Kant goes out of his way to argue that
the question of how pure practical reason can be practical cannot be
answered, he is not only interested in the validity of the CI, but also in
its power to motivate. In this respect, he points out that pure practial
reason (the pure will) is still one’s own will. Kant argues that, if this
will and its law were not one’s own will, and hence the law were not
one’s own law, one still were to find a nonmoral motive to actually
comply with this law, i.e. a motive to want (or to do, respectively) what
onewould not want to do: “For if one thought of him only as subject to
a law (whatever it might be), then this would have to bringwith it some
interest as a stimulus or coercion, because as a law it did not arise
from his will, but rather this willwas necessitated by something else to
act in a certain way in conformity with the law” (GMS, 432,32–433,3).
In the ‘metaphysics of morals’ as part of GMS II, Kant had already
asked for the “possibility” (GMS, 427,17) of awill that is merely deter-
mined by reason and thus asked for the “ground of a possible categori-
cal imperative, i.e. of a practical law“ (GMS, 428,5). This ‘ground’, he
says, can only be “something whose existence in itself has an absolute
worth“ (GMS, 428,3) – a rational and free being as an end in itself. 
Since the absolute worth of rational beings as ends in themselves is
grounded in their autonomy,19Kant then – in order not to beg the ques-
tion (for the law of this autonomy is the CI the very validity of which
is suspicious) – argues in GMS III with the ontoethical principle and
the ontic superiority of the pure will of the ‘eigentliche Selbst’. In the
context ofGMS II,Kant sets forth the “postulate” (GMS, 429,35) that
every rational being must understand his or her own being as such an
‘end in itself’ (a postulate that is then demonstrated in sections 2 and
3 ofGMS III).He already provides arguments that this status justifies
why one must, and how one can, subject oneself to the moral law as a
categorical imperative: “The will is thus not solely subject to the law,
but is subject in such a way that it must be regarded also as legislating
to itself, and precisely for this reason as subject to the law (of which
it can consider itself as the author)” (GMS, 431,21, second emphasis
D.S.). It is because the human being gives himself the universal law
19 Cf. Kant’s lecture Feyerabend (1319 ff.). I cannot get into this but one should not
forget that an important variant of the CI is based on the idea of the human being
as an end in itself; cf. Schönecker / Wood (22004, 140–153).
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that this law can motivate us: “The moral ‘ought’ is thus his own nec-
essary volition as a member of an intelligible world and is thought by
him as an ‘ought’ only insofar as he at the same time considers himself
as a member of the sensible world” (GMS, 455,7, m.e.); this is why
Kant so often emphasizes that “this ‘ought’ is really a volition” (GMS,
449,16, m.e.). Thus Kant not only attempts to demonstrate that there
is a good reason to be moral, but at the same time – and this is partly
responsible for the confusionGMS can easily cause – the deduction of
the moral law provides an incentive to be moral: „Das Gute ist immer 
das, was ieder Mensch will, und er würde es auch immer thun, wenn
es ihm nur nicht schwer würde, es auszuüben, und wenn unsereNatur 
so beschaffen wäre, daß wir immer nach dem Begriff des guten han-
delten, so wären wir recht frei“.20 The moral insight that Kant wants 
to induce with the addressee of the moral law is that he, the addressee
himself, in some sense already wants what he ought to do.
2.4 Some brief critical points
As mentioned before, it is not the purpose of this paper to criticize (or
further develop) Kant’s deduction. However, let us briefly look at some
critical points whichwill also help us to better understandKant’s argu-
ment. I don’t find it convincing at all, neither from an external nor from
an internal point of view. Externally speaking, Iwould criticizeKant’s
axiology as much too narrow because it allows only rational beings to
haveworth; but that’s a long story and, in any case, not the issue here.
Internally speaking (i. e. presuming Kant’s own critical philoso-
phy), it is quite obvious that Kant avails himself of an ontological in-
terpretation of his own distinction between thing in itself and appear-
ance that otherwise is merely a epistemological distinction. Let’s have
a look at OP one more time. The first part of the ontoethical princi-
ple (OP1–3), we said, must be reconstructed as follows: ‘Because the
world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense; and
because hence theworld of understanding also contains the ground of
the laws of the world of sense; and because hence the world of under-
standing also in regard to my will, which belongs wholly to the world
of understanding, is immediately legislative and must also, in regard
to my will, be thought of such that it (theworld of understanding) con-
tains the ground of the world of sense and its laws …’. As seen earlier 
in our detailed analysis, it seems that Kant has a general principle in
20 MM, 903.
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mind according to which the world of understanding is the ground
of the laws of the world of sense which is only applied to the special
case of thewill; hencewhatKant would be saying is that the purewill,
which is a member of theworld of understanding, contains the ground
for the laws of the will as a member of the world of sense. And as a
matter of fact, right after the deduction in Sec. 4, Kant says that the
good will of an evil man “constitutes by his own admission the law for
his evil will as a member of the sensible world” (GMS, 455,4–6).
But how are we to understand this ‘general principle’? Kant him-
self suggests in Sec. 4 reading it in light of his epistemological asser-
tion that the logical subject is the ground for the laws of nature. How-
ever, that the world of understanding is the ground of the laws of the
world of sense does not follow, as suggested by the ‘hence’ in OP2,
from Kant’s own fundamental claim, that one must “assume behind
the appearances something else that is not appearance, namely the
things in themselves” (GMS, 451,12–14). On the other hand, even if
one accepted that somehow the logical subject is the ground of the
laws of the world of sense in terms of that epistemological assertion of
Kant’s, how arewe to understand the application of that ‘general prin-
ciple’ on the will? At best, it seems, there is some kind of resemblance
between the legislation of the logical subject and the legislation of
the practical subject. And yet it is this resemblance that Kants seems
to have in mind. For he closes his official answer to the question of
how a categorical imperative is possible by drawing a parallel between 
OP1–3 and the aforementioned epistemological claim, saying that “it
is approximately in this way that concepts of the understanding,which
for themselves signify nothing but lawful form in general, are added
to intuitions of theworld of sense and through that make possible syn-
thetic propositions a priori on which rests all cognition of a nature” 
(GMS, 454,15–19, m.e.). Well, Kant himself admits that this parallel
is only ungefähr (approximately).
All the more we have to rely in our interpretation of OP on later
passages in which Kant emphasizes the ontic superiority of the world
of understanding (GMS, 457; 461). However, not only is this alleged
superiority in itself dubious, but it is also not in harmony with Kant’s
overall understanding of the distinction between things in themselves
and appearances. According to this understanding, there is, in itself,
one world. This world (of things in themselves) is what it is; this very
world as understood (interpreted) by us, is called the world of sense.
The latter is not, however, in any sense inferior to the former unless
one understands the fact that appearances, except from being appear-
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ances, do not exist as establishing their inferiority; if so, one would
need to draw the awkward conclusion that inclinations (as appear-
ances) are not only inferior but not even real. Yet on Kant’s episte-
mological distinction between things in themselves and appearances,
practical reason and its law (autonomy) is just as real as inclinations
and their law (heteronomy). It could very well be that, axiologically
speaking, practical reason is an end in itself and thus of absolute value
(as Kant postulates in GMS II). To argue, however, that, indeed, it
is (as Kant does in GMS III), based on the alleged ontic superiority
of things in themselves in contrast with appearances, not only makes
little sense on its own, but also cannot be reconciled with Kant’s own
fundamental epistemology.
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